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STUDENT NOTES
THE FEDERAL MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF
1980: A STEP TOWARD DEREGULATION OF
STATE USURY LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 19801 is perhaps the most comprehensive and far
reaching piece of banking legislation to have been enacted since
the 1930's New Deal era. Title V of the Act represents the most
serious Congressional attempt to date to control the amount of
credit extended by national and state lending institutions by
establishing new interest rate limitations on loans made by
these lenders. The focus of the Act, however, is not so much on
federal regulation of interest rates as it is on federal deregula-
tion or preemption of state law restricting interest rates. Under
the new federal system of basing interest rate ceilings largely
on flexible market rates, lenders in those states which do not
choose to override the federal provisions will now be able to con-
tract for and receive interest at rates that are generally higher
than those rates allowed under many state usury laws. The
drafters of the Act had two primary objectives in enacting the
more liberal interest rate provisions contained therein: first, to
allow for more credit availability for certain types of loans in
those states where the availability of credit is reduced because
the lenders in the state are subject to overly restrictive usury
statutes and second, to create more funds that will need to be
generated by depository institutions that are now offering in-
terest on checking or NOW accounts and higher market rates of
interest on time and demand savings accounts.
West Virginia is one of many states which early in their
statehood incorporated tough usury limits directly into their
I Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, reprinted in WASHINGTON FINANCIAL REPORTS (BNA) B-1
(March 28, 1980) [hereinafter referred to as the MCA].
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constitutions. Within the past several years, however, this state
has been among the leaders in easing restrictions on interest
rates that may be charged by state lending institutions. States
such as West Virginia, with usury provisions similar to those
promulgated in the Act, have liberalized their usury statutes in
order to ease the credit crunch within their states. Those states
which have refused to follow the lead of the MCA or its pred-
ecessor laws may have done so in the belief that there are no sub-
stantial credit shortages within their boundaries. However,
even these states may be forced to re-evaluate what their credit
position might be in light of the very real possibility that the
growing inflation in this country will eventually force their
lenders to cut back on their volume of lending when they can no
longer make a fair return on loans bearing interest at the max-
imum rate permitted by state law. Finally, even though argu-
ments as to the necessity of lifting or easing of interest rate
restrictions may prove to be unconvincing, some states may be
persuaded to adopt the new federal provisions (in toto, or in
part) by the practical aspects of allowing lenders a greater
return on their "investments." Specifically, the idea that such
extra income may be applied to interest now payable on check-
ing or NOW accounts lends impetus to the trend toward easing
interest restrictions.
II. AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF USURY LEGISLATION
Go with me to a notary, seal me there
Your Single bond. And, in a merry sport
If you repay me not on such a day,
In such a place, such sum or sums as are
Expressed in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for an equal pound
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken
In what part of your body, pleaseth me.2
Ever since man first began lending money, the idea of exact-
ing an interest for the lending of or forebearance of money has
been widely and loudly criticized. The Mesopotamian civiliza-
tion, which made use of credit and paid interest as early as 3000
B.C., placed regulations on the taking of interest.' The Old
2 W. SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice in SHAKESPEARE, THE COMPLETE
WoRKs 771 (G. W. Harrison ed. 1968).
1 Frierson, Changing Concepts on Usury: Ancient Times Through the Time
of John Calvin, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 115, 118 (1969). These ideas were summarized in
[Vol. 83
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Testament is replete with warnings against those who intend to
loan on a usurious basis.4 This abhorrence intensified during the
early Christian era and out of it grew a combination of legal and
theological restrictions. As the Church gained power, it imposed
an absolute restriction on the practice of exacting interest.'
The church and others who have supported strong usury
laws have traditionally urged one or both of the following argu-
ments in support of their views. The first contention is that it is
morally reprehensible to loan money for interest in any amount,
to any person. The second argument is premised on the idea
that the market place is imperfect in the sense that complete
knowledge of all conditions and prices is not immediately avail-
able to all participants, and that even if it were, such partici-
pants would not necessarily use that information to the best of
their advantage.' The concern is over the inequitable relation-
ships that are likely to result in dealings between the "unsophis-
ticated Borrower" and the "unscrupulous lender"; the "Shylock"
in the days of Shakespeare, the "big impersonal lender" in the
modern corporate world.
These views continued in Europe throughout the Middle
Ages. But as trade and commercial enterprises started to in-
crease in size and number so did the need for commercial loans
and, subsequently, the need for interest bearing loans.7 The
legal prohibitions on interest began to weaken, although strong
moral and religious objections remained.' The focus of criticism
shifted from the taking of any interest to the exaction of
unreasonable or excessive interest.9 By the seventeenth cen-
the Code of Hammurabi (1800 B.C.) which set maximum interest rates at 33% on
loans of grain and 20% per annum on loans of silver.
' See Ezekial 18:13, which states: "He has lent on Usury; has taken interest;
he shall surely not live .... He shall surely suffer death; his blood is upon him."
Deuteronomy 23:19-20, states: "Thou shall not lend upon usury to thy brother;
usury of money; usury of victuals; usury of anything .... Unto a stranger thou
mayest lend upon usury, but unto thy brother thou shall not lend upon usury."
Note, Usury Legislation-Its Effects on the Economy And a Proposal for
Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 199 (1980).
' Giles, The Effect of Usury Law on the Credit Market Place, 95 BANKING
L.J. 527, 529 (1978).
Frierson, supra note 3, at 120-21.
' Note, supra note 5, at 200, 201.
9 Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAw 333, 335
(1967). England, in 1545, became the first modern European country to adopt a
legal maximum rate of interest. The law was entitled "A Bill Against Usury" and
1981]
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tury, interest charges were considered an acceptable function of
business as long as maximum rates were set by legislation."
In America, usury regulation was largely relegated to the
state legislatures." Although most states enacted usury ceilings
by legislative action, is some states public sentiment against
high interest rates was so strong that usury limits were incor-
porated directly into the states' constitutions." The usury
statutes in effect in most states, even as late as the mid-1970's,
could be traced back to the American colonies where English
precedents were adopted soon after the settlements' forma-
tion." Usury legislation, it was believed at first was necessary to
protect the average consumer from oppressive contracts with
lenders who would otherwise take advantage of their necessi-
tous condition and to insure the availability of credit for
business purposes.'
As early as the late 1700's, arguments that there was no
logical economic support for general statutory ceilings on in-
terest rates were beginning to be heard. 5 But the drive to
repeal the states' usury statutes was short lived. The United
States Supreme Court, in Munn v. Illinois,"6 affirmed the con-
stitutional power of the states to regulate business "devoted to
a public use." The decision established that it is within the prov-
ince of the legislature to enact limitations on the rate of charges
"for services rendered in public employment or for the use of
property in which the public has an interest."'17 Apparently, the
provided from maximum interest at ten percent. In 1713, the rate was lowered to
five percent.
" Note, supra note 5, at 201.
" Giles, supra note 6, at 527.
See ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13 (1947); CAL. CONST. art. XV (Deering Supp.
1981): TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (1870, amended 1978) (maximum limitation on in-
terest rates the legislature may remove).
IS S. HOMER, A History of High Interest Rates 274-75 (2d ed. 1977).
Massachusetts adopted a legal maximum rate of eight percent in 1661 and
Maryland a rate of six percent in 1692. These rates were a general legal max-
imum applying to all extensions of credit.
" Shanks, Practical Problems in the Applications of Archaic Usury
Statutes, 53 VA. L. REV. 327, 328 (1967).
" Note, supra note 5, at 201-02.
I 94 U.S. 113 (1887).
"T Id. at 134.
[Vol. 83
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Court reasoned that the market place, above certain limits, is
not to be trusted.18
III. USURY LEGISLATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Although all the states, with three exceptions,19 refused to
repeal their general usury ceilings, most states began to create
some exceptions to these laws. A common exception, which ap-
pears in many forms and concerns a great number of loans
made, provides for less restrictions on business credit." Some
states achieve this by denying corporations and partnerships
the defense of usury,2' or simply by removing such business en-
tities from coverage of the state's usury provisions.' Other
states apply different rate limitations for loans made to individ-
" Giles, supra note 6, at 528.
" New Hampshire, Maine, and just recently, the District of Columbia now
allow unlimited interest rates. Massachusetts provides that if there is no agree-
ment or provision of law for a different rate, interest on loans of money are not to
exceed six percent. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 111 (1972). But parties may
lawfully pay, receive, or contract for any amount of interest subject to the right
of authorities issuing licenses to pawnbrokers to prescribe maximum rates of in-
terest for pawnbrokers and the right of the States Small Loans Regulatory Board
to prescribe maximum rates for unlicensed state small loan lenders. MAss. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 140, § 96 (Michie/Law. co-op 1980). Certain exceptions are also
made for some home mortgage loans. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 140, §§ 90, 90A
(1972 and Michie/Law. co-op 1980). New Hampshire's usury provisions are similar
to those of Massachusetts, exceptions being made for second home mortgage
loans and small loans up to $5,000 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 398A:2, 3 and 399A:3
(Supp. 1979). The Maine Legislature repealed Title 9, § 228 of its code and replac-
ed it with Title 9-B § 432 which only provides that the maximum legal rate of in-
terest on loans made by a financial institution, in the absence of an agreement in
writing establishing a different rate, is six percent per year. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9-B, § 432 (1980). Interest on consumer loans are still subject to Title 9-A of
the Maine Consumer Credit Protection Act. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A (1980).
"o Long, Trends in Usury Legislation- Current Interest Overdue, 34 U.
MIAM L. REV. 332-33 (1980).
" E.g., W. VA. CODE § 47-6-10 (1980 Replacement Vol.); OHio REv. CODE §
1701.68 (Page 1978).
1 E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:703 (West Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §
47-14-09 (Supp. 1979); OHio REV. CODE § 1701.68 (Page 1978). For a consideration of
the abuses of the corporation exception, see Note, Stemming Abuses of Cor-
porate Exceptions From the Usury Laws: A Legislative and Judicial Analysis, 59
IOWA L. REv. 91 (1973). This note considers whether the purpose of usury laws to
protect the individual borrower is being circumvented in many states because of
the ease of incorporation.
1981]
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uals and to businesses.' In several states, if the loan exceeds a
certain amount there are no restrictions on the interest rates.'4
West Virginia specifically excludes loans made for business pur-
poses from coverage of its laws limiting interest rates; provided
that if the debt is incurred by a natural person, the principal
amount of the loan must exceed $20,000.1
Further relaxation of state usury laws began just after the
turn of the century as the vast majority of state legislatures
adopted special consumer credit laws that regulate particular
types of loans and often remove them entirely from coverage of
the usury laws.26 The first such consumer credit legislation con-
sidered and adopted by many states was modeled on the Uni-
form Small Loan LawY This Act recognized the need for small,
expensive but regulated lending facilities. Under then existing
usury laws, legitimate lenders could not feasibly make small
loans to the growing class of wage earners who could only offer
income from their jobs as security. The result was that many
borrowers turned to unregulated loan sharks for their bor-
rowing needs.' Under the Uniform Small Loan Law, certain ap-
proved and licensed lenders, usually personal finance companies,
were permitted to charge higher than the legally permitted
rate. In return for this privilege, participating lenders agreed to
abide by state consumer credit protection regulations."
Mississippi's usury law provides for a ten percent ceiling for loans, but for
loans over $250,000 to partnerships and over $2,5000 to corporations there is a
fifteen percent ceiling. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 7517-1(3), (5) (Supp. 1978). See also
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 408.030, 408.035(1), (2) (Supp. 1979).
1 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (Supp. 1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1343.01(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. § 360.010(1)(b) (Supp. 1978); S.C.
CODE § 34-31-30 (Supp. 1978). See text accompanying notes 113-18 infra.
2 W. VA. CODE. § 47-6-11 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
2 See Id. §§ 46A-4-101, 107, 111, 113.
See generally Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan
Laws, 8 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1941). The Uniform Small Loan Law
(USLL) was originally recommended by the Department of Consumer Credit
Studies of the Russell Sage Foundation in 1916. Other drafts of the USLL were
written in 1918, 1919, 1923, 1932, and 1935.
' Seidl, Lets Compete with Loan Sharks, HARV. Bus. REV. 69 (May/June
1970).
' West Virginia's Small Loan Law is largely incorporated into its Consumer
Credit Protection Act. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2-101 to 138 and
46A-4-101 to 113 (1980 Replacement Vol.) and specifically §§ 46A-2-105 and 115
with respect to balloon payments and limitations on default charges.
[Vol. 83
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This model Act was received very favorably and was quickly
followed by a number of similar laws. These special statutes
established new rate ceilings for particular types of loans and
exempted the transactions from coverage of the general usury
statute.' The most common examples are statutes regulating
the practices of pawnbrokers, credit unions and installment
sales finance companies. Many states also adopted special stat-
utes providing for bank installment loan regulation.31 Pro-
ponents of usury law reform believe that all these exceptions
reveal a tacit admission by state legislatures that the lines of pro-
tection of the all inclusive statutory ceiling were drawn too
broadly for the relevant public purposes for which they were
enacted.
32
Where the states did not make statutory modifications or
exemptions to the general usury rates, the common law did. In
Hogg v. Ruffner,' the Supreme Court held that the so-called
time-price differential was not usurious. The time-price doctrine
draws a distinction between interest for cash advances and
higher prices paid for merchandise sold on credit. In essence,
the seller of goods is allowed to fix one price for an immediate
cash sale and another price if the purchaser decides to buy the
same goods on credit.' The time-price doctrine has survived for
See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 387 (1968). In the late 1960's criticism of the inconsistencies in and complex-
ity of the web of state consumer credit legislation resulted in a drive to forumlate
a uniform consumer credit law to address the problem of consumer credit on a
comprehensive basis. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (hereinafter referred
to as UCCC) emphasized regulation of credit practices while allowing a
reasonable rate of return to lenders. It provided for graduated ceiling rates on
consumer loans (0-$300, 36%; $301-$1,000, 21%; $1,000-$25,000, 15%). Unfor-
tunately, the UCCC did not achieve the same support the Uniform Commercial
Code received. The following states have adopted the UCCC: Colorado, 1971;
Idaho, 1971; Indiana, 1971; Iowa, 1974; Kansas, 1974; Maine, 1974; Oklahoma, 1969;
South Carolina, 1975; Utah, 1969; Wisconsin, 1973; and Wyoming, 1971.
11 See W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5a (1980 Replacement Vol.). See generally B. CUR-
RAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 1-4 (1965); Johnson, Regulation of
Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MfcH. L. REV. 81 (1967).
" It has also been suggested that these exceptions represent an unconsious
acceptance by legislatures that establishing an interest rate ceiling does not con-
trol the actual market price of credit.
66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861).
See generally Sporn, How to Avoid Usury Problems in Sales of Business
Purpose Goods, 25 PRAC. LAW. no. 6, at 73-85 (1979). The time-price doctrine per-
1981]
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the most part, but it has been overruled in a number of jurisdic-
tions. 5 Although West Virginia neither expressly recognizes or
rejects the validity of the doctrine, it, like many other jurisdic-
tions, has enacted a retail installment sales act in an attempt to
control the doctrine and its potential for abuse. 8
By prescribing a maximum rate to be charged for finance
charges on consumer credit sales, the West Virginia Legislature
in no way meant to imply that credit sales and loans are concep-
tually alike. It merely rejected the idea that because the two are
different, sales of consumer credit goods should not be subject
to any restrictions on finance charges. It is noted, however, that
West Virginia Code section 47-6-11 removes all interest rate re-
strictions for "any debt that is incurred by a loan, installment
sale, or other similar transaction and is incurred primarily for a
business purpose .... ,,I But even in respect to sales of business
purpose goods it cannot be said that West Virginia has adopted
the time-price doctrine for the very simple reason that this pro-
vision exempts both loans and credit sales made for business
purposes, making no distinction between the two.
mits mechants to compensate for the risk of non-payment by incorporating a
charge directly into the price of goods purchased on credit. The theory of the
time-price differential is that it includes factors in addition to interest, such as
depreciation, obsolescence, risk of collection, and inducement for a purchaser to
pay cash. The ultimate rationale is that the sales of goods is not a loan of money
and therefore beyond the coverage of the typical usury statute that applies only
to the loans or forebearances of money.
See generally, Giles, supra note 6, at 537-44.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-3-101 (1980 Replacement Vol.) provides that with
respect to a consumer credit sale, other than a sale of real estate or a sale pur-
suant to a revolving charge account, a seller may contract for and receive as a
finance charge a rate not exceeding 18% per annum on that part of the unpaid
balance of the amount financed which is $1,500 or less and 12% per annum on that
part of the unpaid balance which is in excess of $1,500. Id. § 46A-3-102 prescribes
a maximum rate of 8% per annum for finance charges in connection with a con-
sumer credit sale of real estate. With respect to sales finance charges for revolv-
ing charge accounts, section 46A-3-103 permits a seller to charge 18% per annum
on the first $750 and 12% per annum on that part of the unpaid balances which
are in excess of $750. The West Virginia Code also provides that credit sales
guaranteed or insured by certain federal agencies are not subject to state laws on
finance charges. Id- § 46A-3-105. For a survey of other states' treatment of the
time-price doctrine see Sporn, supra note 34, at 81.
W. VA. CODE § 47-6-11 (1980 Replacement Vol.) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 83
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A. Economic Effects of Restrictive Usury Legislation
The runaway inflation that began to grip this country in
1973 and 1974 and that has continued until this very day has
"depreciated the value of money faster than it could be compen-
sated for by most traditional hedges and nearly all widely ac-
cepted investment media."' This trend has produced two dis-
tinct and pronounced effects on the economy. First, those who
had money withdrew billions of dollars out of traditional
depository institutions and reinvested such monies in nontradi-
tional areas. One major result of this was that in many sectors of
the economy there were no loans to be had at any price. 9 Sec-
ond, those who did not have surplus funds to invest saw their
real disposable income shrinking. 0
Inflation, then, has caused an immense pressure to purchase
consumer goods before prices go any higher. This pressure to
purchase goods before prices go up and the tendency of most
people to naturally place a high value on the present use of
goods have combined to produce a very profound effect upon the
economy. Historically, it has been shown that high interest rates
do not deter borrowing when the price of goods is expected to
increase and loans obtained can be repaid with devalued dol-
lars." This phenomenon can be seen today, especially in the
housing and home mortgage industry. Interest rates on mort-
gages and housing prices are at record highs, but there has been
no appreciable decrease in buyer demand."2
As inflation continues, it has become apparent that restric-
tive usury legislation has lost touch with economic realities.
Because of the higher rate of inflation, and because many of the
borrowers could only offer the shrinking earnings from their sal-
aries as security, lenders everywhere had little choice but to
either invest their monies in some other area or increase the in-
terest rates on loans made by them. These interest rates con-
Giles, supra note 6, at 527.
FED. RES. BULL. A14, A15, and A16 (November, 1976).
Giles, supra note 6, at 528.
"Living With High Interest Rates, FORTUNE, (October 23, 1978) at 9.
42 See Consumers Debt Rose $15 Million during August, Wall St. J. Oct. 9,
1980, at 31, col. 4; Recent Surge in Interest Rates Puts Prospects for Recovery in
Danger, Wall St. J. Oct. 14, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
1981]
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tinued to rise and approach or surpass the return permitted
lenders by many state usury laws." These states had to raise
their usury ceilings or else suffer severe credit restrictions
adversely affecting their economies." In those states where in-
terest rates remained artifically low (by legislation), banking in-
stitutions had no choice but to cut back on their volume of lend-
ing.'5 Any benefits of lower interest rates in these states were
offset by a decreased availability of funds for lending. The result
was, and still is, that high risk borrowers, typically those lower
income persons whom the laws are intended to protect and who
are often the most willing to pay high interest rates, are denied
credit altogether." Such persons have been forced to take their
business to neighboring states that have less restrictive usury
laws or to go through informal and illegal channels in order to
obtain the money they need. 7
B. Current Trends
Faced with the need for changing its interest and usury
laws, a state legislature has several alternative courses of ac-
tion: It may repeal existing usury statutes and cease regulation
of interest rates altogether; it may simply raise the general
usury ceiling to a rate at or near the current market rate; or it
may attempt to create a flexible floating interest rate ceiling. In
five states, the contract rate of interest is subject only to the
limits of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code or Small Loan laws
enacted in those states." The other states that have adopted the
Note, Usury: 1979 Florida Statutory Reform Partially Solves Usury
Regulation Defects, 31 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 756 (1979).
" Long, supra note 20, at 328.
' Note, supra note 5, at 199.
See Giles, supra note 6, at 530. This article notes that in those states
where the standard method of supply and demand allocation is restricted, ie.,
where the price of money is not allowed to the point where supply just equals de-
mand, some non-price criteria such as credit history or perceived riskiness is used
to decide who will get the loan. See also Avio, An Economic Rationale for
Statutory Interest Rate Ceilings, 13 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 61, 67 (1973). Although
it may be argued that such laws which restrict the money available for credit, ac-
tually serve to protect the poor from high interest rates, most economists and
legislators have rejected this overly-paternalistic view.
Walker, Effect of Usury Laws on Real Estate Development, 9 REAL
ESTATE L.J. 30-38 (Summer 1980).
" 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) § 510 at 1301-309. (Sept. 18, 1979).
[Vol. 83
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UCCC retain contract interest ceilings for loans not covered by
the UCCC.49 It seems that the tendency of most states has been
to create a hybrid form of usury legislation, raising or complete-
ly eliminating interest rate ceilings for certain types of loans or
lenders and establishing some kind of floating interest rate ceil-
ing for others. The combinations vary greatly from state to
state.
Those states which have adopted floating interest rates do
so on the premise that if the market is left to respond to natural
forces of supply and demand, the optimum allocation of re-
sources will occur, arguing that misallocation, distortion and
cross-subsidization will occur in the absence of such freedom."0 By
basing the maximum interest rate on various changing ecnomic
indicators, states provide flexibility to keep state lenders com-
petitive with the national market rate and also provide protec-
tion to borrowers against being charged an excessive rate of in-
terest out of line with current economic reality.
States with floating interest rate ceilings use several dif-
ferent economic indicators as indices. These different indices
yield a range not only of rates, but also of stability for the rates
set. 2 Some economic indicators change more in response to fed-
eral government activity, while others are more sensitive to
changes in the money market caused by actual commercial trans-
actions. "The problem facing state legislatures when choosing
an appropriate index for interest rates, is to select one which is
neither so volatile that it becomes inflationary, nor so unre-
sponsive that it is as restrictive as the fixed rates it is intended
to replace."2
At present, six states index interest rates to long term (ten
years or more) United States government bond yields.' On the
", Id. at Report 285 (Aug. 8, 1979). Colorado, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah and
Wyoming.
0 See Goldberg, Effect of State Banking Regulations on Bank Credit Card
Use, 7 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 105 (1975).
11 Long, supra note 20, at 325.
12Id. at 334.
13See GA. CODE ANN. § 57-101.1 (Supp. 1979) (real estate loans); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 74, § 4(2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IowA CODE ANN § 535.2(3a) (West
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average, these states allow lenders to charge about two percent
above the bond yield rates.' Four of these states, including
West Virginia, apply the rates so derived only to home mort-
gage loans. The two other states, New York being one of them,
apply it generally.5
Long term government bond yields are almost risk-free
rates. They are, therefore, a more stable economic indicator
than short term money market rates which vary more widely in
response to changing economic forecasts." Mortgage loans are
also usually long term and are affected similarly by factors af-
fecting bond yields. Thus, states which distinguish between com-
mercial and home mortgages loan rates usually use bond yields
as the index for mortgage interest rates.57 Historically, long
term bonds have a higher yield than short term bonds. 8 At the
present, however, the reverse is true. 9
In general, interest rates indexed to bond yields are lower
than those indexed to short term money market indicators such
as the Federal Reserve discount rate, the commercial bank
1 The additional percentage gives the lender compensation for the added
risk of lending funds to people who are less secure than the federal government.
3 W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b(1) (1980 Replacement Vol.). This provision con-
templates that maximum interest rates on non-precomputed loans secured by
mortgages or deeds of trust should be prescribed from time to time to reflect
changed economic conditions, current interest rates, and the availability of credit
within the state for construction and purchase of adequate housing, im-
provements, and the establishment and expansion of business and agricultural
enterprises situate in the state. The same section authorizes and directs the State
Banking Commissioner to prescribe each month, by order, a maximum rate of in-
terest for the next month for loans made for the purposes mentioned above that
are secured by a mortage or deed of trust. The Banking Commissioner is directed
to use as an index for such interest rates the monthly index of long term twenty
year United States government bond yields. The effective maximum rate of in-
terest that may be charged is not to exceed this index rate plus an additional one
and one-half percent per year. The rate so derived is to be valid for the term of
the contract.
Long, supra note 20, at 334.
See text accompanying notes 103-08 infra.
"Yield" refers to the investment rate of return of a bond; the net income if
held to maturity.
1 Living with High Interest Rates, supra note 41, at 9. When short term
rates rise above the long term rates, it is due to a general expectation that either
inflation or growth are going to increase.
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prime lending rate, or the discount rate for ninety-day commer-
cial paper at the district Federal Reserve Bank. States using
these kind of indices generally allow their lenders to charge
three to five percent above the money market rates.'
Alaska and Delaware index interest rates for all loans (up to
$100,000) to the Federal Reserve discount rate." This rate is the
fee charged by Federal Reserve district banks to member com-
mercial banks for advances and is adjusted by the Federal
Reserve to conform to other money market rates. 2 States bas-
ing interest rates on commercial banks' prime rates (ie., in-
terest rates on short term loans charged by commercial banks to
their most credit worthy customers) apply such rates only to a
limited extent." Many states imposing floating interest rate ceil-
ings use as an index the local district Federal Reserve bank dis-
count rate on ninety-day commercial paper. 4 This rate is based
on actual commercial transactions, and is thus more directly
responsive to changes in the economy than bond yields. It is also
the least speculative of the short term money market rates."
National banks have their interest rates indexed to this discount
rate.8 In Montana, interest on all loans is indexed to the ninety-
day commercial paper discount rate. 7 West Virginia uses this in-
E.g., MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 47-125 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. ANN. §
1343.01(4) (Page Supp. 1978).
11 ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (Supp. 1978). DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2301 (Supp.
1980).
62 Prime Rate Charged by Banks, FED. RES. BULL. A26 (August, 1979).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 99.050(2) (1975).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 287.214 (Interim Supp. 1977); Although Kentucky's usury
statutes do not expressly provide that maximum interest rates are to based on
the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper, this particular statute
authorizes banks and trust companies to charge what national banking associa-
tions are allowed, and section 85 of the National Bank Act provides, in part, that
national banks may charge interest at a rate of one percent in excess of the dis-
count rate on ninety day commercial paper.
" See G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 948 (7th ed. 1973).
Federal Reserve Board Regulation A ensured that this "eligible paper" is not
speculative in nature and has the endorsement of the bank presenting it for dis-
count.
- 12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West Supp. 1979).
6" This index is used for all loans made within the state, but the maximum
percentage allowed in excess of this rate increases from four percent to five per-
cent for loans exceeding $500,000. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 47-125 (Supp. 1977).
1981]
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dex to set an alternate rate for all lenders."
Fixed legal contract rates of interest range from seven
percentum per annum in Michigan to twenty-one percentum per
annum in Rhode Island, to an unlimited rate of interest in Mass-
achusetts, New Hampshire, Maine and the District of Columbia.
Among the states retaining fixed contract interest ceilings,
eight percent, ten percent, and twelve percent simple interest
per annum are the rates most frequently adopted.69 Florida has
recently adopted an eighteen percent general usury ceiling.70 In
West Virginia, parties may contract in writing for payment of
interest for the loan or forebearance of money at a rate not to
exceed eight percent per annum or for some other rate authorized
by other provisions of the West Virginia Code."
It should be noted that in all these states, as well as in all
those using a floating interest rate ceiling, the laws provide ex-
ceptions that allow higher rates for certain lenders or transac-
tions.72 Several states, while retaining a general fixed rate, have
removed interest ceilings entirely from large loans. The thres-
hold varies from state to state.7" Some states exempt just bus-
iness purpose loans,7' while others exempt all loans made by
financial institutions which are secured by first mortgages on
real estate.75
These last exceptions include provisions: excluding VA-FHA
loans;76 exempting Savings and Loan associations;7" providing
See also Ky. REV. STAT. § 287.214 (Interim Supp. 1978) which permits state banks
and trust companies to charge interest at the rate allowed national banking asso-
ciations which is one percent in excess of the discount rate for all loans made for
less than $15,000.
1 See text accompanying notes 124-25 infra.
1 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) § 510 at 1302-309.
" FLA. LAWS 1979, c. 79-274 § 13 (amending FLA. STAT. § 687.03-1978).
71 W. VA. CODE. § 47-6-5 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
71 See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
" S.C. CODE § 34-31-30 (Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 360.010(1)(b) (Supp.
1978).
7' W. VA. CODE § 47-6-11 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
71 Id. § 47-6-5b; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 432.2 (1978).
7 IOWA CODE ANN. § 682.46 (West 1946); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(3)
(Page Supp. 1979).
77E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.395 (West Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-9 (West Supp. 1979).
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special higher rates for realty mortgages; 8 and eliminating
limitations on conventional home loans.79 The result of all these
exceptions is that in many states the percentage of the total
private debt subject to the general usury ceiling is less than
that percentage that is not subject to the general ceiling10
IV. THE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS DEREGULATION
AND MONETARY CONTROL ACT OF 1980
Unfortunately, some states have been very slow in advanc-
ing changes in their usury legislation, while others have made
only negligible changes in the rates they allow. Starting in 1974,
Congress began to consider the problems caused by overly re-
strictive regulation of interest rates in some states and pre-
empted state usury laws with regard to certain loans made by
certain lenders." Congressional efforts culminated in the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
,1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(4) (Page Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §
82.010(6) (1977).
T E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-9 (West Supp. 1979); VA. CODE §
6.1-330.37 (1979).
1 See Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-the Usury Headache, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 819, 856 (1968). Of a study made as long ago as 1968, it was
found that out of the fifteen states studied, in only one was more than 50% of the
total private debt subject to the general usury statute.
" See Act of October 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557 [1974]. This
law permitted national banks and federally insured state banks and savings and
loan associations to charge interest on business and agricultural loans, in the
amount of $25,000 or more, at a rate of up to five percent in excess of the Federal
Reserve discount rate in the district in which the lending institution is located,
regardless of any state provision. The law expired in July, 1977, but similar legis-
lation, although limited in its application to Arkansas, was enacted November,
1979. Act of November 5, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-104, 89 Stat. 789 [1979] FED. BANK-
ING. L. REP. (CCH) 58,900. The legislation applied only in those states with con-
stitutional provisions limiting interest to ten percent and has an expiration date
of July 1, 1981.
In December, 1979, Congress enacted Public Law No. 96-161, temporarily
preempting all state interest rate restrictions on business and agricultrual loans
over $25,000. Act of December 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1557 [1979]
FED. BANKING L. REP (CCH) 98,080. For a six month period ending July, 1980,
Congress substituted a federal standard in place of the state restrictions, permit-
ting interest charges up to a maximum of five percent in excess of the prevailing
federal discount rate. This bill also preempted state restrictions on interest rates
for residential loans and mortgages. Id.
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of 1980,82 signed into law by President Carter on March 31, 1980.
Title V of the Act preempts can be traced back to exemptions
contained in Public Laws 93-501, 96-104, and 93-501, the MCA
respresents Congress' intention to include more types of lenders
within the scope of these earlier exemptions and to establish
some degree of permanancy for the exemptions.
A. Section 501
Section 501 of Title V of the MCA preempts state usury ceil-
ings on loans, mortgages, or credit sales secured by a first lien
on residential real property, all stock in a residential housing
cooperative, or residential mobile homes.' State usury ceilings
applicable to residential manufactured home financings are only
covered by this federal preemption if the financing is in accord-
ance with consumer protection provisions promulgated by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and section 103c of the Truth in
Lending Act.4 The preemption provisions in section 501 apply to
mortgage loans and credit sales made by financial institutions85
and to the sale or exchange of real property which is financed by
the individual who owns and occupies such property as his prin-
cipal residence.8 Congress also removed state usury ceilings on
rates paid on deposits, accounts, or other obligations by
depository institutions (defined as federally insured commercial
banks, national savings banks, credit unions, savings and loan
associations and certain other lending institutions). Interest
rates paid by these institutions are still subject to federal
regulation."
82 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, reprinted in WASHINGTON FINANCIAL REPORTS (BNA) B-1
(March 28, 1980).
Id. § 501(a)(1}(A).
" Id. § 501(c) and (d).
Id. § 501(a)(2}(A).
Id. § 501(a)(1)(C)(vi).
Id. § 501(a)(2). In the Senate discussion concerning this provision, Senator
Cranston remarked that in addressing this problem this bill exempts deposit ac-
counts from state usury laws so savers may receive a fair return on their
deposits.
" See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1979) with respect to interest rates paid by in-
sured banks. Title II of the MCA, however, mandates the gradual removal of such
federal interest rate regulation.
[Vol. 83
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It must be noted that the preemption provisions created by
section 501 apply only to state laws expressly limiting interest,
discount points and similar charges. Interest rates paid and
charged by these institutions are still subject to consumer pro-
tection provisions contained in state law and federal regulations
promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and in-
clude those provisions with respect to balloon payments, prepay-
ment penalties, late charges and other provisions as the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board or states may thereafter provide.89
Section 501(b)(2) of the MCA provides that states affected
by the preemptions of this section have the express right to
override the preemptions by reenacting or reasserting their
own affected usury laws within three years after the enactment
of the Act. Otherwise, the preemptions are permanent. A state
override, either by action of the legislature or the voters, in
order to be effective, must explicitly and by its terms refer to
the federal preemption statute.
B. Sections 511 and 521 to 524
Section 511 of the MCA preempts state usury ceilings on
business and agricultural loans for $1,000 or more made by any
person" until April 1983, subject to the right of the states to im-
mediately override the preemption." Such a preemption occurs
only if the new federal ceiling for such loans is greater than the
applicable state ceiling.2 The new federal ceiling is five percent
in excess of the Federal Reserve discount rate, including any
surcharge thereon, on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at
the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve District where
the person or institution making the loan is located.
Sections 521 through 524 of Title V of the MCA provide that
state chartered insured banks,9' federal and state chartered in-
See Regulations For Federally Related Mortgage Loans-Federal Home
Loan Bank Board Final Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,113 (1980) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R.
§ 590); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2-105 and 46A-2-115 (1980 Replacement Vol.) (balloon
payments and default charges).
I Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 511(a).
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sured savings and loan associations, 5 small business investment
companies," and federal and state chartered insured credit
unions 97 may charge one percent over the Federal Reserve dis-
count rate on ninety-day commercial paper (or the rates permit-
ted by state law if higher) on all loans notwithstanding state
usury laws. 8 This preemption is also permanent, subject to
reimposition of usury ceilings by the states.9
C. Policy Considerations
The objectives in including Title V in the MCA are clear.
They have found partial expression in earlier federal and state
legislation involving interest rates. No doubt, the severity of
mortgage credit crunches in recent years, in some states,
prompted the preemptions included in section 501 of the Act.
The drafters of this section sought to prevent the artificial dis-
rupture of funds availability and the frustration of national
housing policies and programs which occur when state usury
laws require mortgage rates below market levels of interest
and, subsequently, mortgage funds in those states flow to other
states where market yields are available to lenders.9 ' It was
also thought this particular modification of state usury law was
needed to facilitate functioning of a national secondary market
in mortgage lending. Section 511 of the MCA marks an attempt
on the part of Congress to increase the availability of funds for
business and agricultural loans in certain states. Sections 521 to
524, which establish generally a new floating interest ceiling for
certain state and federal chartered institutions, represent an at-
tempt to bring parity in this area to the regulation of national
banks and other lending institutions.
But there is yet another, albeit not so obvious, reason




These provisions are similar to the ones found in Section 85 of the Na-
tional Bank Act governing the rate of interest that can be charged by national
banks. 12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West Supp. 1980). See text accompanying notes 118-19 in-
fra.
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 525.
'" Walker, supra note 48, at 30-38.
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vides for a gradual phaseout (over a ten year period) of ceilings
on interest rates payable on time and demand savings depos-
its. ' By allowing lenders to receive a fairer return on their "in-
vestments" in the form of higher interest yields on loans they
make, it is hoped the same can improve their earnings enough to
pay depositors market rates on savings accounts, as well as to
begin to offer interest now payable on checking or NOW ac-
counts. This would allow depository institutions to be more com-
petitive with unregulated (and usually uninsured) money market
instruments offering market interest rates."2 To this aim,
Subsection two of section 501 seeks to ease prohibitions of those
usury laws that prohibit not only lending at a usurious rate, but
also prohibit a consumer from knowingly receiving such a rate;
ie., provisions which prohibit depository institutions from pay-
ing the increased interest when the interest ceiling phasein re-
quired under Title II exceeds the state's usury ceilings.
D. Future of the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980: Its Chances for Success
There can be little doubt that all these goals are desirable in
and of themselves. It is also safe to assume that the provisions
contained in Title V of the MCA can contribute to the accom-
plishment of these goals if they are followed by those states to
whom they are especially directed. But it still remains to be
seen whether these states will, in fact, decide to reassert or
reenact their own usury laws affected by the preemptions of Ti-
tle V. Some states may view the ambiguities inherent in some of
the exemptions so compelling as to necessitate the need to
revert back to their own usury provisions. Still other states may
view the rates prescribed by Title V as so repugnant or so in ex-
cess of what they deem necessary to accomplish their goals that
they reassert their own rates."3
,0 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 201.
02 See legislative history of Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 in 94 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 84041 (1980).
10 Harroch & Frasch, The New California Usury Law, 35 Bus. LAW 1058-59
(1980). It is important to note that to the extent state law is more liberal to the
lender, such law governs rather than the rates provided for by the MCA.
However, some states with higher yielding rates may, as a matter of suggestion,
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Section 501 of the MCA provides, in essence, for unlimited
interest rates on home mortgage loans. This section takes into
consideration two key elements which the majority of state laws
do not consider: the degree of the borrower's business sophisti-
cation or bargaining power and the degree of risk assumed by
the lender in making the loan. Because home mortgage loans are
generally fully secured by real estate, the lender assumes less
risk than when making general consumer loans. Consequently,
there is a more constant market rate and less opportunity for
taking advantage of a naive borrower. Stated another way, the
lender cannot take advantage of the needy borrower when the
borrower has the option of transacting in an open market with
other lenders who would charge virtually the same rate."' The
fact that a person is in a position to purchase a home indicates
he should be sophisticated enough to need only the protections
usually accorded the normal consumer.
No doubt, this preemption represents some improvement
and provides for more credit availability in those states where
the maximum rate of interest, whether fixed or based on some
sliding scale, is so artificially low that lenders are discouraged
from making home mortgage loans. At the same time, there are
those who would argue that unlimited interest rates are appro-
priate only in business loans, and not in general consumer or
home mortgage loans. People who take this position advance the
opposite arguments of those made by persons who favor unlim-
ited interest rates in this area. They contend that the market-
place is imperfect and not truely indicative of the state of the
economy; that unconscionable contracts may arise out of unregu-
lated dealings between the lender and the borrower; that even
though borrowers are still protected by the common law prin-
cipal that equity will not enforce an unconscionable contract,
needy borrowers may be too afraid to complain of unreasonable
interest charges, or may not, despite state and federally man-
dated disclosure of interest charges, even be aware of the unrea-
sonableness of the interest rates charged."5 Finally, it is argued
that since there is less risk for the lender in home mortgage
cut back on their own liberality and decide not to give the lender the option of
lending at the higher state regulated rate.
104 Note, supra note 5, at 221-24.
'0 Long, supra note 20, at 337.
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loans he should not expect such a high rate of return for his "in-
vestment."'u
Those states which wish to increase the availability of credit
for home mortgage loans over that level presently allowed
under their usury laws, but, for some reason or another, desire
not to allow an unlimited rate of interest, have the option of
selecting some new compromise rate they feel is both high
enough to provide lenders a competitive return on their money
and low enough so as not to place an undue burden on the bor-
rower. While it is true that even a floating interest rate ceiling
may still be too restrictive if set at or only slightly above a
single unresponsive economic index, many economists have urged
that it is desirable to distinguish between rates for short term
business or consumer loans and long term home mortgage loans
when deciding what is the most appropriate index on which to
base interest rates.1" Georgia, Illinois, Pennsylvania and West
Virginia have all distinguished between commercial and home
mortgage loans and have based interest rate ceilings for the lat-
ter on long term United States government bond yields."°'
Even if those states with restrictive mortgage usury laws
decide to reject section 501 of the MCA, and instead decide to
employ some compromise maximum rate that is higher than the
rates previously allowed by the individual states, it still may be
said that section 501 succeeded in fulfilling its drafters' objec-
tives. The possibility that some states will retain the section as
part of their own laws brings pressure on the other states to
modify their own rates to the point where they become fairly
comparable with the free market rate. Indeed, it is possible that
many states have already been forced to proceed in this direc-
tion because some of the states surrounding them have already
'' This argument is premised on the fact that most home mortgage loans are
fully secured by the realty concerned.
1 See generally, Giles, supra note 6 at 544. A good argument may be made
that because the government holds weekly auctions of bonds and notes and
decides, via the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, how many and what
types of issues will be offered, the Treasury bond rate is a managed rate, and
therefore it is not representative of the economy.
" W. VA. CODE § 47-6-5b (1980 Replacement Vol.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, §
4(2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 57-101.1 (Supp. 1980); 41
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 301 (Purdon 1980).
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chosen, on their own accord, to make certain exceptions for
residential mortgage loans in their usury laws.
While in the area of residential home mortgage loans it is
not possible that a state have an interest rate ceiling any more
liberal than the "no ceiling rate" prescribed by section 501 of
the MCA, such is not the case with regard to loans made for
business or agricultural purposes. Some states, while retaining a
fixed general interest rate ceiling, have removed interest ceil-
ings entirely from large loans. The threshold varies from state
to state. For example, Alaska, Delaware and Ohio exempt loans
in excess of $100,000.10 In Kentucky, the threshold is only
$15,000;10 in South Carolina it is $500,000.111 Certainly, some
business and agricultural loans exceed these thresholds and can
thus be included in the exemptions. Other staes specifically ex-
empt business purpose loans over a certain amount."2 Again, the
threshold varies from state to state. It should also be noted that
in any state which preempts from its usury laws loans made to
corporations and/or partnerships, certain loans made for bus-
iness or agricultural purposes may fall within the scope of the
preemption. West Virginia's usury laws do not apply to loans to
corporations or partnerships, or to loans to natural persons if
the loan is made for $20,000 or more and is primarily for a bus-
iness purpose.1 A business purpose, however, does not include
agricultural purposes."4
Of course, section 511 of the MCA will have no effect at all
on states that already use the federal discount rate on ninety-
day commercial paper as the index for the maximum rate of in-
terest to be allowed on business and agricultural loans over
$1,000. Nor will it have any significant impact on states which
totally exclude from their interest rate ceilings business and
agricultural loans made for over $1,000. Thus, this particular
federal preemption is of little significance in West Virginia, ex-
cept as to loans made for agricultural purposes.
il ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2301(c)
(Supp. 1980); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1978).
110 Ky. REv. STAT. § 360.010(1)(b) (Supp. 1978).
.. S.C. CODE § 34-31-30 (Supp. 1978).
112 W. VA. CODE § 47-6-11. (1980 Replacement Vol.).
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Section 501 should, however, have an impact on states that
have more restrictive interest rate ceilings on business and
agricultural loans as well as home mortgage type loans. It will
pressure states that have low fixed interest ceilings to raise
their maximum permitted rate so that they are more competi-
tive with the rates set in states where credit for business and
agricultural purposes is more widely available. It will have the
same effect on states that use some other floating index besides
the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper as the basis
for the maximum rates they allow on business and agricultural
loans if the index rate so used is generally lower than the dis-
count rate. The discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper is
neither the highest nor lowest of the short term money market
indicators."' But it is the most riskless short term market
rate,1 ' and because it is based on actual commercial transac-
tions, it is one of the most indicative of a fair price for money
under existing business conditions." 7 Finally, the federal preemp-
tion contained in section 511 will also exert this pressure on
states that already exclude these kinds of loans from their usury
statutes and even states that use higher index rates than the
discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper, where the thres-
hold these loans must exceed in order to be so exempted is
greater than the $1,000 requirement of section 511.
Those who contend that sections 521-524 of Title V of the
MCA will create automatic parity between national banks and
certain state chartered financial institutions may not be correct.
Section 85 of the National Bank Act prescribes the maximum in-
terest that may be charged on loans made by national banks.
That section reads in part:
Any association may take, receive, and charge on any loan or
discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other
evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of
the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at
a rate of one percentum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-
day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in
the Federal Reserve district where the bank is located, or in
the case of business or agricultural loans in the amount of
"" MUNN, supra note 65, at 950.
11 Id.
"T Id. at 952.
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$25,000 or more, at a rate of five percentum in excess of the dis-
count rate on ninety-day commercial paper .... its
In the past, the language of this section permitting national
banks to charge "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the
State"1 9 has been open to several different constructions. One
possible interpretation is that whenever a rate is specifically set
by state law for state chartered banks, national banks will also
be limited to that rate, even though other creditors in that state
may be permitted to charge a higher rate. This interpretation
has been called the "parity doctrine."" Under the second inter-
pretation, national banks may charge the highest rate of in-
terest permitted to be charged by any person, except that if an
even higher rate is permitted to state chartered banks, the na-
tional banks may charge those higher rates. This construction is
called the "most favored lender doctrine" and was adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Tiffany v. National Bank of
Missouri. 21
Although there has been no Supreme Court decision directly
on point on this subject since 1873, beginning in the 1970's,
several federal courts and at least two state supreme courts
have decided cases in which they have recognized the "most
favored lender doctrine."" More important, the Comptroller of
the Currency's Interpretive Ruling 7.7310 states that:
A national bank may charge interest at the maximum
rate permitted by State law to any competing State-chartered
or licensed lending institution. If State law permits a higher in-
terest rate on a specified class of loans, a national bank making
such loans at such higher rate is subject only to the provisions
I' 12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West Supp. 1980).
119 Id.
"0 Higgs, Rate Limitations, Interest and Usury, 33 Bus. LAW 1043, 1056
(1978).
n 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
1 See Comm'r of Small Loans v. First Nat'l Bank of Md. 268 Md. 305, 300
A.2d 685 (1973); Rockland-Atlas Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Murphy, 329 Mass. 118,
110 N.E.2d 638 (1953); Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972);
Northway Lanes. v. Hackley Union Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.
1972); First Nat'l Bank in Mena v. Knowlin, 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975); Fisher v.
First Natl Bank of Chicago, 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976); Fisher v. First Nat'l
Bank of Omaha, 548 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1977).
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of State law relating to such class of loans that are material to
the determination of the interest rate."s
Pursuant to this interpretation, a national bank may charge the
highest rates of interest permitted by state law to state chart-
ered or licensed lending institutions such as small loan com-
panies and savings and loan associations.
It is of great significance that the provisions of the MCA,
while permitting certain state lending institutions to charge in-
terest at a rate not exceeding one percent above the discount
rate, do not limit those institutions to this prescribed rate.
Because these institutions can still charge applicable state rates
(where the state rate is greater than the discount rate) and
because some states do allow credit unions, small investment
companies and the like to charge greater interest rates than
permitted state banks, the argument can be made that in those
states which follow the "most favored lender doctrine," sections
521 to 524 of the MCA will have little effect in establishing par-
ity between national and state chartered banks. National banks
still have the option of charging interest in excess of what their
own state prescribes for its own state chartered banks.
At this point, it should be noted that several states have
already enacted "parity" bills on their own accord. During the
1980 session of the West Virginia Legislative, such a parity bill
was enacted.' It authorizes the West Virginia State Banking
Commissioner to prescribe a maximum rate of interest on loans
made by, in effect, all lenders, which rate may not exceed one
percent above the discount rate on ninety-day commercial
paper. This "maximum" rate, however, serves only as an alter-
native to the interest rates authorized by other provisions of the
West Virginia Code. West Virginia's alternative rate statute
permits state lenders making any consumer loan to charge the
highest of rates permitted by code section 31A-4-30a (the parity
statute) section 47-6-5b or section 47-6-5c. 11 By permitting state
banks to charge what other state lenders are permitted, the
West Virginia Legislature has effectively resolved the national
state bank parity issue without having to disturb the most
In 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310(a) (1980).
'" W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-30a (Cum. Supp. 1980).
12 Id. § 46A-3-117 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
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favored lender doctrine. Whether section 85 of the National
Bank Act is construed to mean that national banks could, as an
alternative to the rate prescribed therein, choose rates permit-
ted by state banks, or whether it is interpreted to mean that
they may charge the highest rates permitted other state lend-
ers, national banks in West Virginia no longer have any more op-
tions than state chartered banks are now allowed to choose
from.
In states that have adopted parity or alternative rate
statutes similar to West Virginia's, it is doubtful that sections 521
to 524 of the MCA will have any additional effect in creating
parity between federal and state chartered lending institutions.
But because these provisions do not prevent state lenders from
charging interest at even higher rates, where state law so pro-
vides, it is doubtful whether in those states which allow some
lenders, but not state banks, to charge more than one percent in
excess of the discount rate, that parity will result between na-
tional and state chartered banks. Of course, these sections will
create the desired parity in those states which, by their own
laws, do not allow any lenders, banks or otherwise, to charge in-
terest in excess of one percent above the discount rate or
ninety-day commercial paper.
CONCLUSION
Loans and interest rates are no longer purely local
phenomena. While banks generally are prohibited from lending
across state lines, other lending institutions are not subject to
such restrictions. In addition, most major banks have offices in
almost every state from which they can generate loans. Because
the credit industry is no longer just a local phenomenon, and
because federal efforts at controlling the nation's money supply
by targeting reserve requirements have mostly failed, it seems
certain that the trend at the national level toward federal regu-
lation of interest rates will continue. And in most likelihood, it
will continue along the same lines with which it has proceeded
since Public Law 93-501.11
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It appears that Congress is sold on the idea that permitting
lenders to charge higher interest rates will ease the credit
crunch on home mortgages, business, and agricultural loans cur-
rently existing in many states. That Congress will not waiver in
this belief is evidenced by the logical progression of the various
preemption provisions Congress has enacted since 1974. It is evi-
denced most recently by some of the amendments Congress has
just recently attached to the MCA, specifically, that provision
lowering the threshold over which business and agricultural
loans must exceed in order to be exempted, from an original
figure of $25,000 to $1,000, and the provision now preempting
financings by individuals on sales or exchanges of real
property. 1 7
Although several states have already seen fit to reject some
or all of the preemption provisions of Title V," this may not
deter Congress' future attempts to regulate in this area.
Because the credit industry has a significant impact on the na-
tional economy, any future federal legislation of interest rates
should withstand scrutiny under the commerce clause." In
order to forestall future federal preemptions, or in the event
that such preemptions become inevitable, states should enact
usury laws conforming to the rates most likely to be adopted by
federal law so that they may minimize the disruptive effects of
such federal law.
Peter Daniel Levy
Pub. L. No. 96-399, §§ 324(d), (e) [amending the MCA].
5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH), Report 317 (October 29, 1980).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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